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SEXISTS, MISOGYNISTS AND THE MALE-DOMINATED
WORKPLACE: WHETHER PREVAILING WORKPLACE NORMS
SHOULD DISCREDIT A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN
WILLIAMS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, women are entering traditionally male-dominated occu-
pations such as construction and law enforcement.' Often, sexually crude
language and behavior, pornography and graffiti permeate these places of
employment. 2 Some commentators suggest that these sexual images are
1. See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1190-98 (1998) (discussing blue-collar, white-collar and professional wo-
men employed in male-dominated fields). Nearly thirty percent of the American
work force is in blue-collar jobs, but women in the blue-collar environment have
faired poorly. See Women in Nontraditional Work: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Comm. on theJud. H.R., 100th Cong. 1 (1988) (statement of Hon. Don Ed-
wards) (discussing the progress of women in labor force). For instance, women
are increasingly entering jobs such as law enforcement. See Kevin Johnson, Female
Cops Survey: Women Muscled Out by Bias, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at IA ("Today,
women make up 13% of the force and the number is climbing."); cf Kirsten Dow-
ney Grimsley et al., Fear on the Line at Mitsubishi, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1996, at Al
(discussing how women are moving into traditionally male-dominated factories).
Many workers experience emotional, physical and psychological stress, lower
productivity, reduced self-confidence, loss of motivation and commitment to their
work and their employer due to sexual harassment. See Kathryn Abrams, The State
of the Union: Civil Rights: Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (discussing devaluation of women who face
hostile work environment sexual harassment); see also Teresa Godwin Phelps,
Gendered Space and the Reasonableness Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 265, 267-68 (1998) (discussing effects of sexual harassment); Ellen
Goodman, Harassment Issue Larger Than Sex, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Mar. 4,
1998, at 5 ("Harassment... has the form and function of denigrating women's
competence for the purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or
incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers."). In one extreme incident,
sexual harassment was said to have caused a female police officer's suicide. See
Margo L. Ely, Threats, Sexism Blamed for Female Officer's Suicide, CHI. SUN, May 8,
2000, at 8 ("A male-dominated workplace can be particularly lonely for few women
who work in such a situation."). In another example, female air traffic controllers
say that the stress of sexual harassment in this male-dominated work environment
adds to the already tense atmosphere. See Chris Woodward & Donna Rosato, Who's
in Control?, USA TODAY, July 18, 1997, at 1A ("These [air traffic] controllers are
subjected to egregious acts of sexual harassment and hostile work environment
solely because they were women working in a traditionally male-dominated
profession.").
2. See Richard Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Interdisciplinary Approach to Understand-
ing Social Sexual Conduct at Work, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 556, 564 (1999) (dis-
cussing theories of social sexual conduct). Some commentators suggest that male-
dominated workplaces are more sexualized, which in turn increases the probability
that some of the social sexual conduct crosses over into sexual harassment. See id.
(613)
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deterring women from entering into this type of work and have the effect
of undermining women's competence and authority while on the job.3
Sexual harassment suits are similarly on the rise.
4
(discussing two surveys of male-dominated workplaces); cf Schultz, supra note 1, at
1687 (articulating that sexual harassment is "designed to maintain work ... as
bastions of masculine competence and authority"). For example, the New York
Police Department is male-dominated and "some say is notorious for sexually
harassing female officers .... " Peter Noel, Riding Gloria, VILL. VOICE, Sept. 19,
2000, at 48.
3. See Eric Matusewitch, Courts Split on 'Prevailing Workplace Norms'Defense to Sex
Harassment Claims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Phila.), July 24, 2000, at 9 (describing
potential detrimental effects on working women). For a discussion of the detri-
mental effects of sexual harassment, see supra note 1.
4. See Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPA as Combined: FY 1992-FY 1999
(Jan. 12, 2000) (providing data on sexual harassment charges filed with EEOC),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html. From 1992 to 1999, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's total charge receipts of sexual harassment
have gone up 44.5%. See id. (providing data on total amount of sexual harassment
charges filed with EEOC during 1992 to 1999). Whereas, the total sex-based
charges have gone up 9.6%. See id. (Jan. 12, 2000) (complying data on sex-based
charges filed with EEOC); available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/sex.html. Inter-
estingly, the rate of merit resolution of the charges filed has only increased 6%
from 1992 to 1999 despite a 44.5% increase in total receipts. See id. (providing
data on merit resolution of total charges filed).
Sexual harassment suits against male-dominated workplaces may also be on
the rise. See, e.g., Ted Cilwick, Female Paramedics Face Hostile Workplace, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Sept. 15, 1996, at C1 (discussing hostile work environment claim by female
paramedics against county fire department); Tina Daunt & Anne-Marie O'Connor,
Female Deputies React with Shock to E-Mail Attacks, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at IB
(discussing outrage at e-mail messages that openly degraded female co-workers as
underlying tension of male-dominated police force); Maggie Mulvihill & Ellen J.
Silberman, Trooper Sex Harassment Suit Settled for $109G in '97, BOSTON HERALD, Oct.
8, 1999, at 4 (discussing female state trooper's claims against State); Peter
Ponchna, Jury Finds No Harassment in Navy Case, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 25,
1999, at IB (describing suit against Naval shipyard by female sheet metal worker);
Mickie Valente, Litigation in Investment in HerFuture, TAMPA TRIB.,June 15, 1997, at
I (discussing lawsuit by twenty-five female employees against Smith Barney alleging
hostile work environment).
Sexual harassment of women in traditionally male careers could be a negative
reaction by men to remind women that they are invading an area that society feels
should not be their primary role. See RITA MAE KELLEY, GENDERED ECONOMY 91-92
(1991) (describing reasoning for sexual harassment in male-dominated occupa-
tions). Some surveys, however, suggest conflicting results on whether male-domi-
nated workplaces create more sexual harassment or not. See Wiener & Hurt, supra
note 2, at 563 (comparing two surveys conducted in male-dominated work
groups). One such survey suggests that women in male-dominated work environ-
ments are subjected to "social sexual conduct" and tend to report sexual harass-
ment more. See id. (describing results of survey of Los Angles workers). On the
other hand, other surveys suggest that women in "traditional" jobs such as secreta-
rial positions are equally exposed to sexual harassment in the workplace as those
women in non-traditional occupations. See id. at 564-65 (describing differences
between sexual harassment in traditional versus non-traditional occupations for
women). Despite these results, it is important to remember that it is difficult, if
not impossible, to predict "a causal link between social norms and incidents of
harassment because researchers cannot directly manipulate social norms." Id. (il-
lustrating impracticability of surveying work forces).
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Courts are divided over whether these types of behavior, as they re-
flect the prevailing workplace culture or norm, should discredit the al-
leged misconduct in suits alleging "hostile work environment" sexual
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 A hostile work
environment is created by misconduct that is "sufficiently severe and per-
vasive to constitute sexual harassment." 6 The standard for judging
whether conduct is severe and pervasive is whether the plaintiff subjec-
tively perceived the conduct as severe and pervasive and whether that per-
ception was objectively reasonable under a totality of the circumstances
analysis.7 Recently, in a same-sex sexual harassment case, the United
States Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that social context should be
considered in the totality of the circumstances when judging a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim.
8
In light of this recent Supreme Court dicta, there is a potential for
courts to find that the "prevailing workplace norms" should factor into the
totality of the circumstances analysis.9 In Williams v. General Motors Cop.,'
0
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit radically shifted its
precedent by holding that the standard for sexual harassment should not
vary according to the workplace and that a woman in such a workplace
does not assume the risk of being sexually harassed.1 1 The majority and
dissenting opinions in this case illustrate the debate over what conduct
violates Title VII and whether Title VII was meant to protect women in
male-dominated workplaces. 12
This Note discusses the Sixth Circuit's holding in Williams and ad-
dresses whether the prevailing workplace culture should be encompassed
in the totality of the circumstance test for a hostile work environment
claim. Part II describes the concurrent development of hostile work envi-
ronment claims under Title VII and the use of the prevailing workplace
5. See Matusewitch, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing circuit split among courts).
For a discussion of the differing opinions among courts, see infra notes 53-89 and
accompanying text.
6. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
7. See id., 510 U.S. at 24 (giving standard to judge hostile work environment
claims).
8. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (articulat-
ing factors to consider when deciding whether conduct violates Title VII). For a
further discussion of this case, see infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court dicta regarding fac-
tors to consider in the totality of the circumstance test, see infra notes 72-89 and
accompanying text.
10. 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
11. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 562-64 (clarifying factors to be used in the totality
of circumstances analysis). For further discussion of this Sixth Circuit case, see
infra notes 90-153 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the majority opinion in Williams, see infra notes
90-116 and accompanying text.
2001] NOTE 615
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norms in a totality of the circumstances analysis. 13 Part III and IV analyze
the Sixth Circuit's conclusions regarding treatment of prevailing work-
place norms in the totality of the circumstances test.14 Finally, Part V fo-
cuses on the impact of the Sixth Circuit's decision and compares policy
reasons for allowing this evidence into the totality of the circumstances
analysis with the potential detriment on women's success in the workplace
by doing so. 15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of "Hostile Environment" Claims Under Title VII
1. The Guidelines
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit dis-
crimination in the workplace. 16 Sexual discrimination was a last minute
addition to Title VII on the floor of the House of Representatives. 17 To-
day, some courts and commentators contend that the effective purpose of
this addition to Title VII is to facilitate the women's movement into the
American workplace.18 At the time of enactment, however, commentators
13. For a further discussion of the development in hostile work environment
claims, see infra notes 17-89 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of Williams, see infra notes 90-153, and accompa-
nying text.
15. For a further discussion of the impact of Williams, see infra notes 154-66
and accompanying text.
16. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995). Section
703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-"
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such an individual's race,
color, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Title VII "'afford[s] employees the right to work in environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult"' whether based on sex, race, re-
ligion, or national origin. See Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,
in 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. § 615 (Jan. 29, 1998) (quoting Mentor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). As the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Fifth Circuits have held, Congress' intention for Title VII was to "define discrimi-
nation in the broadest possible terms, thus, Congress chose neither to enumerate
specific discriminatory practices, nor elucidate in extenso the parameter of such
nefarious activities." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); accord
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir.
1971) (discussing scope of Title VII).
17. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 2577-2584 (1964)).
18. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 614, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (articu-
lating that Title VII is "mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity
for the female workers of America"); see also Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-
35 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing purpose of Title VII); Abrams, supra note 1, at 1198
("Title VII provides women with resources crucial to ending sexual harassment on
the job."); cf Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(holding that Title VII was enacted to eliminate prejudices and biases in American
society).
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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believed that sexual discrimination should have legislation of its own and
others hoped that its addition would cause the entire Act to fail.1 9 Despite
concern, the bill passed and as a result little legislative history exists to aid
in interpretation of Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination.2 0
Under Title VII, not all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace is
sexual discrimination.2 1 For example, sexual harassment was not part of
the initial purpose of the Act.2 2 In fact, the language of the statute does
not mention sexual harassment.2 3 Thus, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) was compelled to define sexual harassment that
constitutes sexual discrimination that violates Title VII.
2 4
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines ("Guidelines") specifying what
conduct in the workplace violates Title VII.2 5 The EEOC declared that
sexual harassment violates Title VII and established the criteria for deter-
mining a violation. 26 The Guidelines suggest that two types of sexual har-
19. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63 (citing 110 CONG. REc. at 2577, statement of
Rep. Cellor quoting letter from United States Department of Labor); see also Jane
Goodman-Delahunty, Pragmatic Support for the Reasonable Victim Standard in Hostile
Workplace Sexual Harassment Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'v & L. 519, 521 (1999)
(describing sentiment at time of enactment).
20. See Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 19, at 521 (articulating difficulty in
interpreting Title VII).
21. See EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note 16, § 615 (declaring need to define
conduct that violates Title VII under Guidelines, EEOC Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex, Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (2000)).
22. See Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 19, at 519 (providing overview of sex-
ual harassment law).
23. See id. at 521 (describing legislative history of Civil Rights Act).
24. See EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note 16, § 615 (stating importance of defin-
ing sexual harassment).
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (establishing that sexual harassment violates Title
VII).
26. See id. (declaring sexual harassment violates Title VII). The Guidelines
provide that quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis of employment decisions affect-
ing such individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2).
Hostile work environment differs from quid pro quo claims because co-work-
ers, subordinates or supervisors can create "a hostile atmosphere without threat of
loss of tangible job benefits," and instead create a threat to the "terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." Goodman-Delhunty, supra note 19, at 523 (discuss-
ing differences in legal elements and doctrine of sexual harassment claims). Re-
cently, the Supreme Court has ruled that, for purposes of employer liability, there
is no distinction between quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment. See generally Burlington Industs., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 749 (1998) (blurring distinction between types of sexual harassment ac-
tionable under Title VII).
Although theoretically quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims are
distinct, they often occur together, yet should be evaluated independently. See
EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note 16, § 615. Specifically, the Guidelines define hos-
tile work environment harassment as sexual misconduct that "unreasonably inter-
fere [s] with an individual's work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (3); accord Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)). As
2001] NOTE
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assment constitute a Title VII violation: "quid pro quo" and "hostile work
environment."27 The Guidelines suggest that one should "'determine
whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment ... [by] look[ing]
at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as
the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred.'"28 The EEOC used the Guidelines in its enforce-
ment litigation, and many lower courts came to rely on them as well.29
Although the Guidelines were given considerable deference by some
courts, other courts refused to recognize sexual harassment claims that
were not connected to tangible economic loss, creating a circuit split that
needed resolution.3
°
2. Case Law Developments of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Discrimination
Claims Under Title VII
In Meritor Savings Banks v. Vinson,3 1 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether sexual harassment violates Title VII. 32
First, the Court adopted the Guidelines and confirmed that hostile work
environment sexual harassment was an actionable claim under Title VII. 33
The Guidelines provide that sexual harassment is "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
the Guidelines suggest, the question of whether conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment is dependent upon the record as a whole and the totality of the circum-
stances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
The Guidelines stated that "'while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, they do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' Vinson, 477 U.S.
at 65 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142 (1976)).
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2) (describing types of sexual harassment that
are actionable under Title VII). The Guidelines also provide that a hostile work
environment claim can violate Title VII regardless of whether it was linked to a
quid pro quo claim. See EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note 16, § 615 (discussing types
of sexual harassment claims under Title VII).
28. EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note 16, § 615. The Guidelines also recognize
that the legality of each action will be determined on a case-by-case basis focusing
on the facts. See id. (describing legality of cause of action under Act).
29. See id. (describing weight of authority of Guidelines).
30. See Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 19, at 523 (describing reason for cir-
cuit split).
31. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
32. See Vinson 477 U.S. at 57 (articulating requirements for hostile work envi-
ronment claims). The plaintiff started at the defendant's bank as a teller and was
promoted to assistant branch manager under the supervision of Vice-President
Taylor. See id. at 57 (describing facts of case). Plaintiff worked at the same branch
until her discharge, at which time she brought a claim under Title VII alleging
constant sexual harassment by Taylor. See id. (same). Plaintiff alleged that Taylor
repeatedly demanded sexual favors, which she complied with out of fear of losing
her job, and fondled her as well as other women employees at the branch. See id.
(same).
33. See id. ("[W]e hold that a claim of 'hostile environment' sex discrimina-
tion is actionable under Title VII ....").
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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of a sexual nature."34 The Court then added more stringent requirements
than those suggested by the Guidelines, holding that the sexual harass-
ment "must be sufficiently pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment. ' ' 35
Although the Court identified a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, lower courts were left to specify elements of the cause of ac-
tion and a legal standard by which the claim should be judged. 36
Generally, lower courts agreed that in order for a plaintiff to prevail
he/she "must prove: (1) membership in a protected class, (2) unwelcome
sexual conduct that is (3) based on gender and (4) is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute sexual harassment."37 While the lower courts
agreed on the enumerated elements, they diverged on the standard that
judged whether conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute
sexual harassment violating Title VII under Vinson.
3 8
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 39 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit articulated the most controversial standard for deter-
mining whether the conduct alleged in a hostile work environment claim
is sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a violation of Title VII.
40
34. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, Sexual Harassment,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2000) (defining sexual harassment).
35. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982)).
36. SeeJane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of the Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 161-62 (1994) (articulating
elements for hostile work environment claim).
37. Id. (enumerating elements of hostile work environment sex discrimina-
tion claim). For the conduct to be considered unwelcome, "the correct inquiry is
whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome." Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68; see also EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note
16, § 615 (providing guidance on how to determine whether sexual conduct is
unwelcome).
38. See Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 161-62 (describing jurisprudence after
Meritor).
39. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
40. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (determining factors used in totality of cir-
cumstances analysis). Rabidue was one of the most controversial decisions in the
development of Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence. See Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1525-27 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (criticizing
objective standard used in Rabidue); see also Abrams, supra note 1, at 1212 n.118
(criticizing Rabidue decision for acceptance of displays of pornography at work);
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myth and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness
in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1232 (1990) (arguing that,"reasonable-
ness in legal ideology [in Rabidue] is simply too closely tied to the idea of objectiv-
ity to the notion that the law can resolve legal conflict without reflecting or
reinforcing any personal perspective"); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 41, 59 (1989)
(discussing how Rabidue court permitted "male myths to bias their measurement of
a reasonable person"); Phelps, supra note 1, at 275 (arguing that Rabidue, "'by
applying the prevailing workplace factor .... locks the vast majority of working
women into workplaces which tolerate anti-female behavior"' (quoting Rabidue,
805 F.2d at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting)).
7
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In Rabidue, the plaintiff was the only woman in a salaried management
position in the company. 4 ' When the plaintiff was fired, she filed a claim
against her employer alleging that the company's refusal to stop the dis-
play of derogatory posters in private offices in combination with the anti-
female obscenities directed at her and other women constituted sexual
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42
The Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff must show that: (1) a reasona-
ble person, judging from the totality of the circumstances, would have felt
that the alleged conduct interfered with his or her work performance and
affected his or her psychological well-being; and (2) that the alleged con-
duct actually affected the well-being of plaintiff.43 The Sixth Circuit also
held that the totality of the circumstances test should include such factors
as "the lexicon of obscenity that pervade[s] the environment of the work-
place both before and after the plaintiffs introduction into its environs,
coupled with the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff upon voluntarily
entering that environment." 44 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit announced
that Title VII was not meant to have a "magical" effect on altering the
American workplace where "humor and language are rough hewn and
vulgar" or where "sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines
may abound."45 Over the next seven years, Rabidue sparked enormous
controversy and a diverse reaction in jurisprudence among lower courts.4 6
41. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 623 (Keith, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of
case); see also Matusewitch, supra note 3, at 9 (same). One poster that remained
visible at the company for eight years displayed "a woman with a golf ball on her
breasts with a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling 'Fore."' Rabidue,
805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting) (describing common work areas of
company).
42. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of
case).
43. See id. .at 620 (discussing standard to be used).
44. Id. The court stated explicitly that "the presence of actionable sexual har-
assment would be different depending upon the personality of the plaintiff and
the prevailing work environment and must be considered and evaluated upon an
ad hoc basis." Id.
45. Id. at 620-21 (articulating purview of Title VII). The court agreed that:
[I] t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor
and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversa-
tions and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-
[nior can it change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity
for the female workers of America. But it is quite different to claim that
Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the
social mores of American workers. Clearly, the Court's qualification is
necessary to enable 29 CF.I?. § 1604.11(a)(3) to function as a workable
judicial standard.
Id. (quoting Newblatt, Dist. J.).
46. See Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 163 (describing jurisprudence after
Rabidue). Some commentators believe that the Rabidue court condoned the very
behavior that Title VII intended to prohibit. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith,J.,
dissenting) ("Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound
.... Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,47 the United States Supreme Court
resolved part of the controversy by setting the standard for judging
whether conduct is severe and pervasive enough to violate Title VII.48 The
Court held that in order for a claim to prevail, the employee must "subjec-
tively perceive" the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter
the terms or conditions of their employment, and this subjective percep-
tion must be objectively reasonable. 49 Therefore, the Court held that a
"hostile" or "abusive" environment should be determined by looking at all
poisoning the work environment of classes protected under the Act."); Dolkhart,
supra note 36, at 162 ("The Rabidue decision has been much criticized for shielding
and condoning misogynist behavior in the workplace."); see also Anita Bernstein,
Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1259 (1994) (stating that
Rabidue judges were apologists for sexual harassers). As one commentator has
pointed out, many courts at that time adopted the Rabidue standard, but others
employed various tests from the reasonable Woman standard to the reasonable vic-
tim standard. See Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 163-64 (describing various standards
used amongst courts).
47. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
48. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23 (articulating standard for determining
whether conduct is severe and pervasive enough to constitute Title VII violation).
Plaintiff Harris was a manager at Forklift Systems, an equipment rental company.
See id. at 18 (discussing facts of case). Defendant company's president, Hardy, su-
pervised Harris and often targeted her as well as other female employees with un-
welcome sexual innuendoes. See id. (same). Plaintiff complained to Hardy about
his conduct, but he did not comply and, as result of further repeated sexual innu-
endoes, Plaintiff filed suit for sexual discrimination due to an "abusive work envi-
ronment." See id. (same).
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee relied
on Rabidue to deny Plaintiff's claim. See id. (describing district court's holding).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to "resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
whether conduct, to be actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment,
must 'seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the plain-
tiff to 'suffer injury."' Id. (comparing Rabidue; with Vance v. S. Bell Tele. & Tele.
Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989); and Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292
(Fed. Cir. 1985), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-878 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. See id. at 21-22 (articulating standard to be used in determination of
whether conduct is severe and pervasive). There was debate among leading civil
rights organizations and feminist legal scholars about what should be the proper
standard. See Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 165-67 (discussing various arguments
made before Supreme Court regarding issue). For instance, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, in their amicus brief, rejected the reasonableness standard in favor
of a subjective standard. See id. at 165 & n.47 (comparing standards put forth by
other scholars and organizations). Even after the Harris decision, there has been
debate over what standard should be applied. Compare Goodman-Delahunty, supra
note 19, at 521 (supporting the reasonable victim standard), with Dolkhart, supra
note 36, at 153 (proposing individualized standard such as test used in battered
women self-defense cases). Different standards proposed and applied range from
the "reasonable woman test" or the "reasonable victim test" to the "reasonable em-
ployee test." Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 19, at 521.
One particularly interesting argument proposes an individualized standard
that takes into consideration the factors that inform the plaintiff's experience of
harassment. See generally Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 167 (proposing individualized
standard). The Court determined that "the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
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the circumstances such as frequency of conduct, type of conduct and
whether the conduct interferes with an employee's work performance.
50
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, criticized the majority opinion for failing
to outline a cohesive legal standard that defines what conduct is "hostile"
or "abusive."5 I Although the Supreme Court clarified the standard for
judging a hostile work environment claim, the lower courts were left with
considerable leeway in determining what evidence should credit or dis-
credit a hostile work environment when judging the conduct by the total-
ity of the circumstances.5
2
position, considering 'all the circumstances."' See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
In addition, the Court held that the plaintiff did not need to prove "concrete
psychological harm." See id. ("So long as the environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious."). The Court held that Title VII bars conduct that would
seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but is not limited to
this type of conduct. See id. (overruling psychological requirement of hostile work
environment claim).
50. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (articulating circumstances that should be con-
sidered in determining totality of circumstances). The Court held that the deter-
mination of severe and pervasive conduct cannot be "a mathematically precise
test." Id. As a result, the Court suggests looking at all the circumstances such as
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreason-
ably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. Justice Scalia agreed
with the majority's list of factors that contribute to a hostile work environment, but
wrote separately to state that no single factor is determinative. See id. at 24 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'Abusive' or 'hostile,' which in this
context I take to mean the same thing, does not seem to me a very clear
standard.").
52. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion's indecisive-
ness). Justice Scalia suggested that the majority opinion would leave juries "virtu-
ally unguided" to decide whether there has been sex-related "misconduct." Id.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia suggested that the standard articulated by the majority
"open [s] more expansive vistas of litigation." Id.
As the Court noted in Harris, the determination of what is severe or pervasive
is not a "mathematically precise test." See id. at 23 (discussing standard to be used
in determination). Whether evidence is sufficient to be considered "severe or per-
vasive" in order to constitute a hostile work environment is extremely fact-sensitive
and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Compare Stacks v. S.W. Bell Yellow
Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding pornographic video that
was shown at work probative of sexually hostile workplace), Beardsley v. Webb, 30
F.3d 524, 528, 532 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding supervisor who called plaintiff "honey"
and "dear" and inappropriately touched her constituted hostile work environ-
ment), Kotcher v. Rose & Sullivan Appliances Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that numerous vulgar comments, lewd gestures, grabbing and comments
about plaintiff's body constitute hostile work environment), Flom v. Waste Mg.,
No. 95C1934, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3575, *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17,1997) (denying
summary judgment where plaintiff alleged four incidents of harassment together
with daily abuse over five-year period), and Laughinghouse v. Risser, 786 F. Supp.
920, 929 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding that one-and-one-half years of unwanted touch-
ing and engaging in offensive conduct after plaintiff rejected sexual proposition
was pervasive enough to constitute Title VII violation), with Hocevar v. Purdue
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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B. Prevailing Workplace Norms
In Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit announced two important principles to
use in judging a hostile work environment claim: (1) the legal standard for
judging whether alleged conduct is severe and pervasive; and (2) the con-
crete factors to consider in the totality of circumstances. 53 Although the
Supreme Court in Harris overruled the Rabidue standard for judging
whether conduct is severe and pervasive enough to constitute hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII, it did not address whether existing
conduct and a plaintiffs voluntary entry into such an environment should
be factors in the totality of the circumstances test.54 As a result, some
Frederick Co., No. 98-4075, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19061, at *60 (8th Cir. Aug. 9,
2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment for hostile work environment claim
based on evidence that co-workers made threats of violence towards women, re-
ferred to women as "fucking bitches" and played sexually explicit prank phone
calls on co-workers), Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 632, 634 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that pornographic computer programs did not constitute hostile
work environment), Wolak v. Vill. of Pelham Manor, 217 F.3d 157, 157 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding verdict that pornographic posters, videos and magazines shown at
work did not constitute hostile work environment should stand), Hartsell v. Du-
plex Prods., 123 F.3d 766, 776 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that alleged offensive com-
ments were only mildly offensive and did not constitute hostile work
environment), Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1274 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
four incidents over twelve-month period were not enough to survive summary
judgment), Black v. Zaring Homes Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that, despite finding verbal comments offensive and inappropriate, evidence re-
vealed that company's employees did not always act professionally and comments
made during meetings were not directed at plaintiff), McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding three comments over three-
month period were not pervasive enough to constitute hostile work environment),
and Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that being called "dumb blonde" and being asked out for dates by supervisors were
not sufficient to find hostile work environment).
53. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (articu-
lating standard and factors to be considered when judging claim). Determining
what behavior is considered severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile environ-
ment under Title VII has never been easy. Cf Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218
F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 2000) (articulating where court made distinction whether
conduct violates Title VII). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit pointed out in Hostetler, the Title VII threshold is passed with conduct such
as sexual assaults, other physical contact, sexual solicitations, intimidating words or
acts, obscene language or gestures and pornographic pictures. See id. (explaining
conduct considered to be violation of Title VII (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l
Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 2000))). Yet, "occasional vulgar banter, tinged
with sexual innuendo" does not pass the threshold. Id. (citing Baskerville, 50 F.3d
at 430-31).
The distinction or combination of conduct that constitutes a hostile work en-
vironment is blurred, which creates difficulty in predicting case to case orjurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction what will constitute a hostile work environment. See Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex, Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)
(2000) ("The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from
the facts, on a case by case basis.").
54. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23 (announcing standard and factors to consider
when viewing circumstances). The Court in Harris did not address existing con-
duct of that in Rabidue because the facts of Harris did not include company wide
11
Torregrossa: Sexists, Misogynists and the Male-Dominated Workplace: Whether Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46: p. 613
courts rely on Rabidue to hold that these factors should be considered in
the totality of the circumstances.
55
In Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.,5 6 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was persuaded by the analysis used
in Rabidue.5 7 The plaintiff in Gross was an operator of a water truck at a
construction site. 5 8 She alleged that her supervisor repeatedly used pro-
fanity in reference to her and demeaned her in front of others. 59 The
Tenth Circuit, relying in part on the reasoning of Rabidue, held that "[i]n
the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not per-
ceived as hostile or abusive[,]" and that plaintiffs claim should be evalu-
ated "in the context of a blue collar environment .... ,,60 As a result, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.6
Other courts specifically focus on whether the alleged offensive con-
duct pre-existed plaintiff's arrival and on plaintiffs choice of entering
such an environment. 62 The EEOC, however, explicitly rejected both vari-
sexual misconduct. Compare Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 623-24 (Keith,J., dissenting), with
Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
55. See Eiland v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., No. 92-CV-76328-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18404, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 1997) (using factors articulated in
Rabidue to grant summary judgment for employer); see also Fortner v. Kansas, 934
F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (D. Kan. 1996) (relying on factors articulated in Rabidue to
grant summary judgment in favor of defendant because "profanity and cussing are
part of the daily life in the military"). In fact, some courts allow employers to assert
a "prevailing work environment or customary business practice defense" against a
hostile work environment harassment claim. See Allan H. Weitzman, Employer De-
fenses to Sexual Harassment Claims, 6 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27, 52 (1999)
(describing defense generally); see also Matusewitch, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing
viability of defense).
56. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir, 1995).
57. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (relying on Rabidue to alter standard).
58. See id. at 1535-36 (discussing facts of case). The supervisor once declared,
to one of the plaintiff's male co-workers, in reference to the plaintiff: "[D]on't you
just want to smash a woman in the face?" See id. at 1535 (describing facts of case).
59. See id. at 1536 (describing facts of Title VII claim).
60. Id. at 1537-38. The Court also remarked, "Speech that might be offensive
or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is
tolerated in other work environments." Id.
61. See id. at 1547-48 (affirming grant of summary judgment). The United
States Court of appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that when it looked at the evi-
dence as a whole, the totality of the circumstances did not support a viable Title
VII claim. See id. at 1547 (stating that when viewing totality of circumstances, plain-
tiff failed to demonstrate genuine issue of material fact).
62. See Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 FEP Cases (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J.
1983) (finding no hostile work environment at chemical plant where sexually ori-
ented language pre-existed plaintiff's arrival); see also Eiland v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., No. 92-CV-76328-DT, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 18404, at *17-19 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
30, 1997) (relying on reasoning in Rabidue to adjust prevailing work place norms
standard). Focusing on this part of the Rabidue decision is essentially an assump-
tion of the risk defense similar to that used in tort litigation. See Weitzman, supra
note 55, at 54 (stating that "assumption of the risk defense, like the prevailing work
environment defense is based on the voluntariness, consent and knowledge," of
12
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ations of the prevailing workplace defense and criticized the.reasoning in
Rabidue.63 The EEOC holds that the reasonable person standard should
be viewed from the victim's perspective and not stereotypical notions of
acceptable behavior. 64 Similarly, some courts reject the defense created
the woman when she entered into employment). The assumption of the risk and
"prevailing workplace norms" defenses are suggested as viable defenses for employ-
ers. See id. at 52-56; see also Matusewitch, supra note 3, at 9 (describing court split
on "prevailing workplace norms defense."). Other courts suggest that the defense
"should only be used in suits that arise against non-employees or where 'sex appeal
is a substantial part of [the defendant's] business and of [the plaintiff's] job in
particular.'" SeeWeitzman, supra note 55, at 53. (quoting Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters:
Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1138 (1995)). Advocates of the defense
believe that by allowing women to assume the risk of sexual harassment, women
are permitted to make voluntary decisions and freely market their sexuality if they
wish. See id. (discussing assumption of risk defense). The viability of assumption of
the risk defense and the prevailing workplace norms defense, however, becomes
more questionable depending upon the type of employment involved. See generally
Cahill, supra (addressing whether assumption of risk defense should apply to cer-
tain hostile work environment claims).
For instance, the controversy over this type of defense was highlighted when a
sexual harassment suit was filed against Hooters Restaurants. See id. at 1108
(describing assumption of risk defense). "Hooters" is a slang term for women's
breasts and Hooters Restaurant is an establishment known for employing wait-
resses "'available... to be ogled... ' Cahill, supra at 1108 & n.2 (quoting remark
of Patricia Ireland, President of National Organization for Women in Patty Shil-
lington, Hooters Concept: Sexist or Just Good, Clean Fun?, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 1,
1993).
Several former waitresses filed suit alleging sexual harassment against Hoot-
ers. See id. (describing facts of case). The plaintiffs claimed that the name of the
restaurant and the uniforms that they were required to wear contributed to the
hostile work environment and thus fostered sexual harassment. See id. (describing
details of complaint). Although the case ended in settlement, it illustrates the ex-
treme position in favor of allowing an assumption of the risk defense as well as the
fact sensitivity of hostile work environment suits. See Weitzman, supra note 55, at
53-54 (describing sparse application of assumption of risk defense).
Interestingly, one court held that a former receptionist who was warned dur-
ing an initial interview that she would be exposed to coarse language and affirmed
that she could handle it, was not barred from bringing an action against her em-
ployer for hostile work environment sexual harassment. See Williams v. Snyder
Roofing & Sheet Metal, 995 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (D. Or. 1998) ("No facts were
stated which would put [plaintiff] on notice that she was agreeing to waive her
statutory right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult."). The Williams court denied defendant's summary judgment
motion, finding:
The facts relied upon by [defendant] do not as a matter of law constitute
a knowing waiver of [plaintiffs] statutory rights under Title VII. [Plain-
tiff] is not equitably estopped from proceeding with her claim for dam-
ages for a sexually hostile work environment because of her
representation in the initial employment interview that bad language
would not offend her.
Id.
63. See EEOC COMP. MAN., supra note 16, § 615 Vol. at n.20 (rejecting reason-
ing in Rabidue).
64. See id. (providing guidance on the issue). The EEOC holds that a woman
does not give up her right to be free from sexual harassment when choosing to
13
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by Rabidue and hold that a male-dominated work environment can credit a
claim of a hostile work environment.6 5 In addition, other courts go fur-
ther to find a duty on the part of the male-dominated employer to ensure
that female employees are not sexually harassed. 66
In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,67 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit announced a duty on the part of
the employer to dispel sexist sentiment in the workplace. 68 The plaintiffs
were former police officers who were subjected to repeated harassment by
work in an environment that has traditionally included vulgar, anti-female lan-
guage. See id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (Keith, C.J.,
dissenting) (rejecting explicitly Sixth Circuit reasoning in Rabidue). The Commis-
sion "believes that a workplace in which sexual slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures,
and other offensive conduct abound can constitute a hostile work environment
even if many people deem it to be harmless or insignificant." Id.
65. See, e.g., Slayton v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir.
2000) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff corrections officer who alleged hostile
work environment because she was routinely called "bitch" and continually being
exposed to explicit rap music, among other sexual innuendos and offensive refer-
ences); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that, in
male-dominated construction site, "[i]ntimidation and hostility toward women be-
cause they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual
advances"); Gonzalez v. Bratton, No. 96 Civ. 6330(VM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12002, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2000) (denying summary judgment for defendant
police department due to evidence of systematic incidents of misconduct in male-
dominated environment); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp.
500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that genuine issues of material fact existed in
plaintiff's claims of hostile work environment based on evidence that she was
called "sweetheart" and "hon" by co-workers in a male-dominated car dealership
where they occasionally hired strip dancers to perform at work). But see e.g., Rouse
v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583, 589-90 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (granting summary
judgment for defendant despite court's "cognizan[ce] of the fact that the combi-
nation of a male-dominated institution and the alleged existence of a code of si-
lence on the police force could produce a stifling environment for sexual
harassment claims").
66. See generally Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that Eveleth's pattern of sexual harassment "destroyed the self-
esteem of the [women exposed to it]"). In Jenson, the court declined to view the
culture of the mining industry, which allows sexual harassment, as a mitigating
factor of Eveleth's culpability. See id. at 1292 (rejecting culture defense).
Female employees of Eveleth Mines filed a class action suit alleging sexual
discrimination in violation of Title VII. See id. at 1290 (discussing beginning of
class action suit). The district court found that the male-dominated workplace
made many references to sex and to women as sexual objects that created a sexual-
ized workplace. See id. at 1292 (discussing district court's findings). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized that the female employ-
ees were subjected to "humiliation and degradation" and it found that the em-
ployer had an increased obligation to prevent a hostile work environment for
females. See id. at 1304 (denouncing the "callous pattern and practice of sexual
harassment engaged in by [defendant company]").
67. 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990).
68. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486 (holding employers have duty to prohibit
sexist sentiment in male-dominated workplace).
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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their fellow workers and supervisors. 69 The defendants "vigorously ar-
gued" a prevailing workplace norms defense, stating "that a police station
need not be run like a day care center."70 The Third Circuit held that
employers cannot be held accountable for isolated incidents of sexism but
did not "consider it an unfair burden of an employer of both genders to
take measures to prevent an atmosphere of sexism to pervade the work-
place." 7 Although not all courts go as far as the Third Circuit, most
courts hold that prevailing workplace norms such as pornography, sexual
conversations and jokes should not discredit a claim for hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment. 7
2
Recently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc.,73 the United
States Supreme Court provided further guidance on the factors to be in-
cluded in the determination of the totality of the circumstances.7 4 Al-
69. See id. at 1471 (discussing facts of case). The alleged harassment included
"abusive language, destruction of property and work product, anonymous tele-
phone calls and . . . physical injury to [one plaintiff]". See id. (discussing facts of
case).
70. Id. at 1486.
71. Id. The court did not entertain the defense and found that an employer
has a duty to "take measures to prevent an atmosphere of sexism to pervade the
workplace." Id. Furthermore, the court elaborated that "[w]hile Title VII does not
require that an employer fire all 'Archie Bunkers' in its employ, the law does re-
quire that an employer take prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing
their opinion in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers." Id. (quoting Davis
v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988)). In addition, the court
held that the totality of the circumstances test is the cumulative effect of individual
incidents. See id. at 1484 (holding that factfinder must look at gravity of all inci-
dents together). The court stated "that the fact finder should not 'necessarily ex-
amine each alleged incident of alleged harassment in a vacuum."' Id. (quoting
Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (lth Cir. 1989)).
72. See White v. N.H. Dep't of Corrs., 221 F.3d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 2000) (up-
holding jury verdict for plaintiff-employee of corrections facility where evidence
demonstrated that pornography and sexual slurs were commonplace); see also
Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (hold-
ing that hostile work environment could be based on anti-female language and
posters). In Barbetta, the district court criticized the reasoning in Rabidue and
found that a hostile work environment could be established by commonplace por-
nography and vulgar comments about plaintiff and other females in the office. See
id. at 573 n.2 (criticizing Rabidue); see also Bennett v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 705 F.
Supp. 979, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that prison atmosphere "does not mean
that anything goes" between co-workers). Some courts find that a "boys will be
boys" defense reinforces the prevailing level of discrimination. See Matusewitch,
supra note 3, at 9 (citing Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 FEP Cases (BNA) 1357
(W.D. Pa. 1993).
73. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
74. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (holding that there must be "careful considera-
tion of the social context" in Title VII sexual harassment cases). This case was a
same-sex harassment case where plaintiff alleged that he was "forcibly subjected to
sex-related, humiliating actions" and was physically assaulted in a sexual manner.
See id. at 77 (describing facts of case). Oncale complained to his supervisors but the
conduct did not stop. See id. (same). Oncale filed suit alleging he was discrimi-
nated against in his employment because of his sex. See id. (discussing claim filed
in district court). The question presented was "whether workplace harassment can
15
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though the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of
whether prevailing workplace norms can discredit misconduct in the total-
ity of the circumstances, dicta in Oncale suggests that the alleged miscon-
duct should be determined by looking at the "social context" of the
workplace. 75 Accordingly, the Court emphasized the importance of deter-
mining all harassment cases with "careful consideration of social context
in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target."76 To
ensure that Title VII does not become a "general civility code" for the
American workplace, the Court suggested discounting alleged sexual mis-
conduct by looking with "an appropriate sensitivity to social context."77
The Court proposed that "common sense" and "an appropriate sensitivity
to social context" are two of the factors that judges and juries can use to
properly determine whether conduct constitutes a hostile work environ-
ment for the plaintiff.78 These criteria, however, are vague and can be
interpreted to support opposite positions. 79 Courts wishing to consider
the prevailing workplace norms find support in these vague statements in
Oncale, whereas other courts use the vague statements to mean that pre-
violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discrimination ... because of... sex."' Id.
at 76 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)).
The Court held that: (1) Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of...
sex" for men as well as women; (2) conduct need not be motivated by sexual de-
sire; (3) a plaintiff must prove in same-sex harassment cases under Title VII that
the conduct is at issue because of sex; and (4) in Title VII sexual harassment cases,
there must be a careful consideration of the social context in which conduct oc-
curs and is experienced by the target of the behavior. See id. at 78-81 (holding that
same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII).
75. See id. at 82 (articulating social impact of workplace behavior).
76. Id. at 81 (discussing inquiry of totality of circumstances). The Court
stated:
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the work-
place; it is directed only at 'discrimination . . .because of ... sex.' We
have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely
because the words use, have sexual content or connotations.
Id. at 80.
77. See id. at 82 ("Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social con-
text, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing ... and
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely
hostile or abusive."). In addition, the Court held that "[t]he real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circum-
stances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed." Id. at 81-82.
78. See id. at 82 (addressing courts' and juries' ability to distinguish between
"simple teasing" or "conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position
would find severely hostile or abusive").
79. See Weitzman, supra note 55, at 58-59 (discussing recent Supreme Court
opinions that provide little guidance on sexual harassment law). As Weitzman
points out: "[Oncale] ha[s] provided a glass that is either half-full or half-empty
[I]t is clear that there is still a great deal of maneuvering room within the
language of the Court." Id. at 59.
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vailing workplace norms should not discredit a hostile,work environment
claim. 80
In Smith v. Sheahan,8 1 for instance, the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit relied on the dicta in Oncale to hold that the
prevailing work place norms defense should not prevail in the courts.82
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in relying on Rabidue
to discount the seriousness of defendant's misconduct.83 The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that such reasoning, as employed by the district court in this case
and by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue, misconstrues Title VII's true pur-
pose.8 4 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that "[e]ven if this aspect of
Rabidue survived Harris, we think it did not outlive Oncale.''8 5 Conversely,
even though the Seventh Circuit held Oncale overruled this remaining as-
pect of Rabidue, it recognized that juries and judges are in a discretionary
position to use "common sense" and "an appropriate sensitivity to social
context" to determine whether the prevailing workplace norms should dis-
credit a claim in the totality of the circumstances. 86 Thus, the Smith deci-
80. See id. (discussing vagueness of recent Supreme Court opinions).
81. 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999).
82. See id. at 535 (noting that "nothing in Oncale... hints at the idea that
prevailing culture can excuse discriminatory actions"). In Sheahan, the plaintiff
was a guard at defendant's jailhouse who alleged hostile work environment sexual
harassment after being assaulted by a co-worker who routinely called her "bitch"
and threatened to "kick [her] ass." See id. at 530-31 (discussing grounds for grant
of summaryjudgment in district court). The district court granted summary judg-
ment on the grounds that plaintiff's experience of harassment was too isolated to
be actionable under Title VII and was discounted partially because she "'volunta-
rily' stepped into the 'aggressive setting' of the jail." See id. at 530, 534 (discussing
decision of court below).
83. See id. at 534 (discussing district court's reasoning).
84. See id. at 534-35 (criticizing reasoning in Rabidue). The reasoning in
Rabidue, as the court explains, would bar minorities and women from bringing a
Title VII hostile work environment claim unless the conduct was "out of line with
the subculture of that particular work setting." Id. The Seventh Circuit also criti-
cized the district court for relying on the assumption of the risk reasoning in
Rabidue to discount the seriousness of the misconduct. See id. The court pointed
out that under Rabidue reasoning:
[A] n African-American worker in an otherwise all-white workplace in an
area with a history of race discrimination would have to withstand a
heightened degree of race-based abuse before he could bring an actiona-
ble claim than the same worker in a setting with a greater tradition of
interracial tolerance.
Id. at 535.
85. Id. at 535 (holding that nothing in OnCae suggests that "prevailing culture
can excuse discriminatory actions"). Further, the court suggested that because the
dicta in Oncale is silent on the issue, it prohibits the inclusion of prevailing work-
place norms into the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 534-35 (holding that
"nothing in Oncale even hints at the idea that prevailing culture can excuse dis-
criminatory actions").
86. See id. at 535 (noting that juries should determine on case by case basis
how much weight to give to prevailing culture). Yet, the court also pointed out
that "the culture of workplaces does differ from setting to setting" and thus, reaf-
firms that juries and judges "must" use their "common sense" and "appropriate
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sion illustrates that the dicta in Oncale creates ambiguous criteria for
determining whether prevailing workplace norms should be included in
the totality of the circumstances analysis. 8 7 Similarly, in Williams v. General
Motors Corp.,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
entered the debate regarding the degree to which prevailing workplace
norms should be evaluated in the totality of the circumstances and put
forth its interpretation of the Oncale dicta.
89
III. FACTS: WLLiAmS V. GENERAL MoToRs CORP.
Plaintiff Marilyn Williams sued General Motors Corporation ("GM")
alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.90 The plant where she worked was male-dominated. 9 1
In May 1995, she was transferred to the "midnight shift" to fill a vacancy
caused by another employee's retirement. 9 2 During the year on the mid-
night shift, co-workers referred to plaintiff as "slut" and subjected her to
several pranks and sexual remarks.9 3 For example, Williams' supervisor
repeatedly made her a target of harsh sexual innuendo.94 For instance,
one day when Williams was bending over, the supervisor came up behind
her and said, "You can back right up to me."95
sensitivity to social context" when determining whether certain behavior violated
Title VII. Id. (relying on Oncale).
87. See id. ("[N]othing in Oncale even hints at the idea that prevailing culture
can excuse discriminatory actions .... At the same time, we recognize that the
cultures of workplaces does [sic] differ from setting to setting."); see also Weitzman,
supra note 55, at 59 (arguing that Oncale can provide support for opposite
positions).
88. 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
89. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 562 (clarifying totality of circumstances test).
90. See id. at 558 (discussing facts of case). Plaintiff was employed at GM for
more than thirty years. See id. (summarizing procedural and factual background).
91. See id. at 563 (discussing plant's work environment).
92. See id. (stating facts). Plaintiff had various jobs during her thirty years at
the plant. See id. at 559 (discussing facts of case).
93. See id. at 559 (same). The district court summarized fifteen specific al-
leged incidents in its unpublished memorandum opinion. See id. (same). The
incidents ranged from general use of profanity to a co-worker, telling her to "rub
up against [him] anytime." Id.
94. See id. at 563 (discussing facts of case). Once plaintiffs supervisor said,
while looking at her breasts, "'You can rub up against me anytime."' Id. On an-
other occasion, plaintiff's supervisor placed his hand around her neck and placed
his face against hers, and noticing that she had written "Hancock Furniture Com-
pany" on a piece of paper, said, "'You left the dick out of the hand."' Id.
95. Id. at 559. Other incidents included co-workers saying to Williams, "Hey
Slut" and "I'm sick and tired of these fucking women." Id. Pranks directed toward
the plaintiff included being locked in her work area, being hit with a thrown box
and finding her office supplies glued to her desk. See id. (listing facts that were
more than "merely oafish behavior").
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A year after switching to the midnight shift, Williams filed suit against
GM under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and under Ohio state law.96
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted
summary judgment in favor of GM, finding that although the incidents
offensive, they "were not so severe and pervasive as to constitute a hostile
work environment under the standard set out in Harris."97 The district
court separated the plaintiffs complaints of alleged hostile work environ-
ment into: "(1) foul language in the workplace; (2) mean or annoying
treatment by co-workers; (3) perceived inequities of treatment; and (4)
sexually related remarks directed towards [Williams]. "98 The district court
examined the plaintiff's enumerated allegations and dismissed each of
them, claiming that some of her allegations were a "second class of com-
plaints."99 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and clarified the factors
to be considered in the totality of the circumstances test when determin-
ing a hostile work environment claim involving prevailing workplace




In reversing the grant of summary judgment on the hostile work envi-
ronment claim, the Sixth Circuit first discussed the standard of review and
the background for hostile work environment claims.' 0 ' Second, the
96. See id. (noting procedure of case). Plaintiff "also alleged retaliation under
Title VII for having filed sex and race discrimination charges with the Ohio Civil
Right Commission." Id. at 560 (detailing time-line of events of case).
97. Id. (describing holding of district court). Similarly, the court held that
plaintiff did not allege a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. See id. at
558 (summarizing holding in district court).
98. Id. at 562.
99. See id. (quoting district court's holding). On the allegation of foul lan-
guage, the district court noted that "although not condoned by the Court and
though certainly well beyond the boundaries of polite behavior, [it] does not sat-
isfy the test enunciated in Harris." Id.
100. See id. at 559, 562-64 (articulating analysis to be used for plaintiffs alleg-
ing harassment in male-dominated workplaces).
101. See id. at 560 (discussing court's review of procedure of case). The court
explained that review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo.
See id. (citing City of Mt. Clemens v. EPA, 917 F.2d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 1990)). The
court noted that summary judgment is only proper where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Further,
the court determined that all evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the plaintiff. See id. (citing
Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 66 (6th Cir. 1979)). Therefore, the court concluded
that "' [w] here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial,"' and summary
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Sixth Circuit discussed the standard developed in Harris and reaffirmed in
Oncale for the totality of the circumstances analysis. 10 2 The court held that
a hostile work environment violation of Title VII must be determined by
the totality of circumstances using "'common sense"' and an "'appropri-
ate sensitivity to social context"' in the analysis. 10 3 Third, relying on this
premise, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court improperly analyzed
each allegation separately.10 4 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
when incidents are separated into their "theoretical component parts,"
each complaint could be more easily dismissed. 10 5 As a result, the Sixth
Circuit stressed that the "totality-of-circumstances examination should be
viewed as the most basic tenet of the hostile-work-environment cause of
action." 1
06
Fourth, in holding that anti-female conduct in a male-dominated
workplace could violate Title VII, the Sixth Circuit determined that this
evidence about the work environment should be not allowed to discredit
judgment should be granted. See id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The court also summarized the precedent in hostile work environment case
law. For a further discussion of hostile work environment case law, see supra notes
31-52 and accompanying text. The court also explained the standards announced
recently for employer liability under Title VII. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 560-61
(providing overview of employer liability under Title VII). The court noted that,
according to recent Supreme Court case law, "[i]f a plaintiff can prove a tangible
employment action, liability is automatic; if however, there was no tangible em-
ployment action, employers have an affirmative defense to liability .... See id. at
561 n.2 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998)).
102. See id. at 562 (articulating proper standard to be used in hostile work
environment analysis).
103. See id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998)). The court noted that the district court "divorced" the incidents from
their social context. See id. ("The [district] court's analysis is clearly premised on
an impermissible disaggregation of the incidents .... ).
104. See id. at 563 ("[T]he totality-of-the-circumstances test mandates that dis-
trict courts consider harassment by all perpetrators combined when analyzing
whether a plaintiff has alleged the existence of a hostile work environment ......
(citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1991))). The court held that determining hostile work environment should be
based on the accumulated effect in which a "holistic perspective is necessary." Id.
(quoting Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524).
105. See id. at 562-63 (providing that incidents must be aggregated in determi-
nation of hostile work environment). The court held further that the issue should
not be whether each incident could pass the Harris test, but whether all of the
incidents together constitute a hostile work environment. See id. The court em-
phasized that where individual instances of sexual harassment do not stand on
their own to create a hostile work environment, "the accumulated effect of such
incidents may result in a Title VII violation." Id.
106. Id. at 563. The court held that the lower courts should examine the
work environment as a whole, rather than focusing solely on individual acts of
alleged hostility. See id. (same). The court quotes Robinson, reaffirming that the
totality of the circumstances analysis must be viewed from a "holistic perspective."
See id. (citing Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524).
632
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss3/4
the pervasiveness of the alleged misconduct within the totality of the cir-
cumstances. 10 7 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court
erred in concluding that the conduct alleged was "'infrequent, not severe,
not threatening or humiliating, but merely offensive,"' and stressed that,
at a minimum, the question was for the jury. 10 8 The court explained that,
when viewed in the proper context and in their entirety, the incidents
could constitute a hostile work environment for the plaintiff.109
The Sixth Circuit recognized that social context must be part of the
totality of circumstances under Oncale, but clarified that the proper con-
text does not allow district courts to "point to long-standing or traditional
hostility toward women to excuse hostile-work-environment harass-
ment."' 10 The court declared that it: (1) rejected a standard that changes
depending upon the work environment; and (2) held that a woman who
chooses to work in the male-dominated trades does not thereby relinquish
her right to be free from sexual harassment. 1 ' In fact, the court reasoned
that this argument would create the notion that women working in male-
dominated occupations deserve less protection from the law than women
working in a courthouse. 112 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that "raising
the standard for women in these professions" would require them to prove
something beyond the objective and subjective standards set forth in Har-
ris and that Title VII would essentially become a general civility code,
which would go against the dicta in Oncale.113
Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that summary judgment was improper
for the hostile work environment claim. 114 While the court used the fac-
tors that were suggested in the Oncale dicta, it held that the assumption of
the risk doctrine for a hostile work environment claim is totally im-
107. See id. at 564 (rejecting shifting standard dependent upon work
environment).
108. Id. at 563-65 (quoting district court).
109. See id. at 563-64 (distinguishing allegations as more than merely
offensive).
110. Id.
111. See id. (quoting Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir.
1995)). The court explicitly disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Gross,
finding such an argument illogical. See id. (stating rationale for court's disagree-
ment with Tenth Circuit).
112. See id. (reasoning that raising standard for women in some professions is
unnecessary). The court stated:
[W]e find this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more
hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more
difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex based conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.
Id.
113. See id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
The court emphasized that "[s]urely women working in the trades do not deserve
less protection from the law than women working in a courthouse." Id.
114. See id. (holding that "a work environment viewed as a whole may satisfy
the legal definition of an abusive work environment, for purposes of a hostile envi-
ronment claim, even though no single episode crosses the Title VII threshold").
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proper."15 The court held that Williams' allegations raised questions of
whether she was subjected to more than "'genuine but innocuous differ-
ences in the ways men and women routinely interact,"' and therefore sum-
mary judgment was improper.1 16
2. Dissent
Judge Ryan, in his dissent, vehemently disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the dicta in Oncale.1 7 He emphasized that, contrary to
the majority, "[t]he Supreme Court has made it very clear that the work-
place environment indeed is a component of the totality of circumstances
to be taken into account in assessing a claim of sexual harassment under
Title VII ... ."118 Furthermore, Judge Ryan stated that "common sense"
essentially means changing the standard of sexual harassment to fit the
prevailing workplace norm. 9 Accordingly, Judge Ryan held that while
the prevailing workplace norms like the crude language and sexual innu-
endo alleged by plaintiff may be generally offensive, these types of conduct
are not what Meritor, Harris and Oncale held to be actionable under Tide
VII.120
Judge Ryan further emphasized that although Title VII was enacted to
provided " [e] quality of opportunity for women across the entire spectrum
of the workplace," this does not mean that federal courts have been "com-
missioned by Congress to force a heightened level of civility upon the blue
collar workplace . . . or . . . redefin [e] workplace sex discrimination far
115. See id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
116. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81). The court also discussed whether con-
duct must be "sexual" in nature, and whether Williams subjectively felt that the
environment was hostile as required by Harris. See id. at 564-68 (discussing whether
conduct need not be sexual and subjective test). In addition, the court discusses
the retaliation claim. See id. at 568 (discussing Williams' retaliation claim for filing
complaint with Ohio Civil Rights Commission).
117. See id. at 569-71 (Ryan,J., dissenting in Part II, concurring in Parts I and
Il1) (stating that majority's interpretation of requirements for totality of circum-
stances test is "dead wrong"). Judge Ryan dissented because "the majority opinion
has so dramatically and radically changed the law in [the] circuit," by disregarding
Supreme Court authority and the Sixth Circuit's binding precedent on the totality
of circumstances test. Id. at 569 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 571 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
119. See id. (Ryan,J., dissenting) (quoting Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d
1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)). Judge Ryan felt that the Tenth Circuit used the
"appropriate common sense" when deciding that plaintiff, a construction worker,
should have her alleged discrimination viewed in "a blue collar environment." See
id. (Ryan,J., dissenting) (discussing use of common sense test (citing Gross, 53 F.3d
at 1538)).
120. See id. (Ryan,J., dissenting). Judge Ryan stated that "[w]hen a female of
ordinary civility, sensibilities, and morality walks into a work milieu that may be
tastelessly suffused with rudeness, personal insensitivity, crude behavior, and
locker room language, she must do so with the understanding that Congress has
not legislated against such behavior and such a workplace environment." Id.
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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more broadly than Congress has defined it in Title VII." 1 2 1 Therefore,
Judge Ryan posited that the "customary 'culture"' must be considered in
the totality of the circumstances analysis. 122 In sum, Judge Ryan argued
that the legal standard articulated in Harris includes an inquiry of perva-
siveness, and thus the context of the "ordinary conditions" is relevant and
inherently important when looking at the totality of the circumstances.
123
In closing, Judge Ryan criticized the majority for "reinvent[ing] the law of
sexual harassment in the workplace [to be] consistent with its view of what
Title VII ought to proscribe."1 24
B. Critical Analysis
The Sixth Circuit addressed whether traditionally anti-female behav-
ior in a male-dominated workplace: (1) should be considered when evalu-
ating the totality of circumstances; (2) bars plaintiffs who voluntarily enter
such a workplace from bringing claims of sexual harassment; and (3) vio-
lates Title VII if taken as a whole. 125 Although the Sixth Circuit reached
the proper result and upheld the intent of Title VII to ensure equal oppor-
tunity for women in the workplace, it did so by creating inconsistent prece-
dent and by perpetuating vague standards for the courts to apply in the
totality of the circumstances analysis.126 The Sixth Circuit achieved this
result by: (1) holding that offensive conduct should be considered as a
whole in the totality of circumstances, but that the offensive nature of the
121. Id. at 572 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Judge Ryan stated that although Title
VII was meant to create equal opportunities for women, it was not created to police
the American workplace. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (discussing purview of Title
VII). Judge Ryan stated that, " [e] quality of opportunity for women across the en-
tire spectrum of workplace circumstances is a civil right guaranteed in the Consti-
tution and made enforceable through Title VII. And that includes opportunities
for employment in occupations and undertakings in which women have not always
been involved." Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). Conversely, Judge Ryan said:
[This intent] does not mean that federal appellate courts have been com-
missioned by Congress to force a heightened level of civility upon the
blue collar workplace-or any other, for that matter-by redefining work-
place sex discrimination far more broadly than Congress has defined it in
Title VII, more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted it in Meritor, Harris, and Oncale.
Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 571 (Ryan,J., dissenting) (discussing what conduct violates Title
VII). Judge Ryan interpreted Oncale as holding that "'in all harassment cases, that
inquiry requires a careful consideration of the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target."' Id. (Ryan,J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Oncale, 523 U.S at 82).
123. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating legal standard that inquiries into
conditions of employment require courts to decide question of pervasiveness in
context of ordinary conditions of relevant workplace).
124. Id. at 572 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 562-64 (clarifying totality of circumstances test for sexual harass-
ment claims).
126. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 100-25 and infra
notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
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workplace should not be considered at all; (2) shifting precedent without
addressing its opinion in Rabidue, and (3) perpetuating the Oncale dicta
that puts forth vague criteria for judging the totality of the
circumstances. 127
1. The Whole Picture
As the EEOC Guidelines suggest, a proper analysis of whether a work
environment is severe and pervasive enough to the reasonable person be-
gins with examining the record as a whole and the totality of the circum-
stances.' 28 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit viewed the record in its totality and
held that the accumulated effect of the work environment as a whole can
violate Title VII even if no single incident passes the Title VII threshold. 12 9
127. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 100-25 and infra
notes 128-57 and accompanying text.
128. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, Sexual Harass-
ment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2000) (articulating that whether alleged conduct
constitutes sexual harassment should be determined by record as whole and by
totality of circumstances, such as nature of sexual advances and context of work-
place). Furthermore, the EEOC provides that the objective standard should not
be applied in a vacuum. See EEOC COMP. MAN., supra note 16, § 615 (discussing
application of standard).
Generally, a "hostile environment" claim requires a showing of a pattern of
offensive conduct. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding
that hostile work environment claim requires conduct that reasonable person
under totality of circumstances would have felt to be so severe and pervasive as to
alter terms and conditions of one's employment); see also Downes v. Fed. Aviation
Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "Title VII [does] not cre-
ate a claim of sexual harassment for each and every crude joke or sexually explicit
remark made on the job[;] .... [instead, a] pattern of offensive conduct must be
proved"). Aggregation of the conduct tends to prove the pattern of offensive con-
duct. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia., 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990)
("What may appear to be a legitimate justification for a single incident of alleged
harassment may look pretextual when viewed in the context of several other re-
lated incidents.") (quoting Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510
(11th Cir. 1989)).
129. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 563 ("[E]ven where individual instances of sex-
ual harassment do not on their own create a hostile environment, the accumulated
effect of such incidents may result in a Title VII violation."). One factor consid-
ered in "the totality of the circumstances test is the cumulative effect of individual
incidents." ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHUZI, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT: FEDERAL
LAw 98-99 (1994) (discussing totality of circumstances test). In reversing summary
judgment, the Sixth Circuit properly held that the totality of the circumstances test
includes all incidents of alleged misconduct and should not be examined sepa-
rately until determining employer liability. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 563; see also
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1472 (holding that incidents should be viewed together); Cal-
loway v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 98-669-SLR, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12642, at *14-15 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2000) (holding that courts should not judge
hostile environment claims on incident-by-incident basis). In Andrews, the Third
Circuit recognized that:
Particularly in the discrimination area, it is often difficult to determine
the motivations of an action and any analysis is filled with pitfalls and
ambiguities. A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its
scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination
[Vol. 46: p. 613
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Thus, the court held a "holistic perspective" is needed to determine the
accumulative effect of all the conduct.' 30 The Sixth Circuit distinguished
Gross in holding that the totality of the circumstances should not vary de-
pending upon the work environment.13 1 In doing so, the court essentially
held that the conduct should be viewed as a whole, but that the work envi-
ronment should not be considered at all. This reasoning complicates the
standard for determining what conduct is severe and pervasive enough to
constitute a hostile work environment.
1 3 2
Despite the inconsistency in its articulation of the test, the court prop-
erly held that prevailing workplace norms are inappropriate factors for the
totality of the circumstances test.133 If prevailing workplace norms are al-
lowed to discredit evidence of a hostile work environment, not only will
there be an unequal application of Title VII, but also Title VII's true pur-
pose will be impeded. 13 4 Based on the same reasoning, the court also
accurately recognized that the assumption of the risk doctrine is an inap-
propriate defense to sexual harassment claims and that allowing it would
raise the bar of proof for women in male-dominated professions.
13 5
analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall
scenario.
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484.
130. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
131. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (disagreeing with Tenth Circuit analysis in
Gross); see also Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile Work Environ-
ment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 341-42 (1999) (criti-
cizing reasoning in Gross).
132. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (Ryan,J., dissenting) (stating that legal stan-
dard allows courts to look at ordinary work conditions). As Judge Ryan notes, the
standard is geared toward determining pervasiveness of the conduct that affects
plaintiff's terms and conditions. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (discussing measure
of legal standard). Thus, to determine pervasiveness, the court must look into the
ordinary conditions of a workplace. See id. (Ryan,J., dissenting) (describing perva-
siveness test).
133. See id. at 564 (discussing holding); see also Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d
529, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Employers who tolerate workplaces marred by exclu-
sionary practices and bigoted attitudes cannot use their discriminatory pasts to
shield them from the present-day mandate of Title VII."); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626-27 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (" [N]o woman should be subjected to an environment where her sex-
ual dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally or physically assaulted
as a matter of prevailing male prerogative ...."); EEOC COMPL. MAN., supra note
16, § 615, at 3233 ("The Commission believes ... that a woman does not assume
the risk of harassment by voluntarily entering an abusive, anti-female
environment.").
134. See Sheahan, 189 F.3d at 535 (holding that allowing traditionally hostile
behavior in workplace to discredit claims is illogical and outside the purpose of
Title VII); see also Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting) (discussing
rationale of prevailing workplace norms in Title VII analysis).
135. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (discussing assumption of risk analysis); see
also Sheahan, 189 F.3d at 535 ("There is no assumption-of-the-risk defense to
charges of workplace discrimination.").
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2. Shifting Precedent
The Sixth Circuit also shifted its previous opinion on the purview of
Title VII. 1 36 By holding that prevailing workplace norms should not dis-
credit the pervasiveness of a hostile work environment, the Sixth Circuit in
Williams correctly held that this type of conduct should not excuse hostile
work environment harassment. 137 More importantly, the Williams court
recognized that an unequal application of the law would result from al-
lowing prevailing workplace norms to discredit claims of sexual harass-
ment.'3 8 This holding, however, is a severe departure from the court's
earlier benchmark holding in Rabidue.1
3 9
The Williams court held that a woman's choice to work in a male-
dominated occupation does not mean that she relinquishes her right to be
free from sexual harassment. 140 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in
136. Compare Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620-21 (affirming lower court finding that
Title VII was not meant to change prevailing workplace norms such as sexual jokes,
sexual conversations, vulgar language or pornographic magazines), with Williams,
187 F.3d at 564 (holding that requiring women in male-dominated professions to
prove conduct beyond objectively hostile standard by allowing prevailing work-
place norms to discredit alleged misconduct is beyond what plaintiff must prove
under Title VII).
137. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (stating that summary judgment was inap-
propriate); see also Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (arguing that
prevailing workplace norms are prohibited under Title VII to prevent such con-
duct from plaguing work environment for those protected by Act); EEOC COMPL.
MAN., supra note 16, § 615, at 3205 (discussing requirements of harassment-free
workplace). The Commission holds that the standard should not consider stereo-
typed notions of acceptable behavior. See id. (discussing findings of Commission);
see also Sheahan, 189 F.3d at 535 (holding that "[e]mployers who tolerate work-
places marred by exclusionary practices and bigoted attitudes cannot use their dis-
criminatory pasts to shield them from the present-day mandate of Title VII");
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that
"Title VII may advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and biases in our soci-
ety") (citations omitted). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (holding Title VII "does not reach genuine but innocuous dif-
ferences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the...
opposite sex"); see also Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that Congress and Supreme Court have not provided that anti-female prevailing
workplace norms are prohibited by Title VII).
138. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (holding that women in different types of
workplaces deserve same protection from Title VII).
139. Compare Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (holding totality of circumstance test
should not vary depending on work environment), with Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620
(holding that level of obscenities in work environment that existed both before
and after plaintiff's arrival must be examined).
140. Compare Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (holding assumption of risk doctrine is
not valid in claims of sexual harassment), with Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (conclud-
ing that plaintiff's reasonable expectations and voluntary entry with knowledge of
work environment should be evaluated when determining hostile work environ-
ment claim). The Rabidue court described the assumption of the risk doctrine in
the sexual harassment arena when it held that "the reasonable expectation of the
plaintiff upon voluntarily entering [an] environment" should be considered in the
totality of the circumstances. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (articulating assumption
of the risk doctrine); see also Weitzman, supra note 55, at 54 (discussing assumption
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Rabidue held that prevailing workplace norms should be factored into the
totality of circumstances.14 1 As a result, the Williams court effectively over-
ruled Rabidue without explicitly doing SO.142 The Williams opinion does
not explicitly state its departure from its former holding in Rabidue.143
The court, in fact, criticized the Tenth Circuit in Gross without noting that
the Gross court solely relied on Rabidue when articulating the principle that
the standard in reviewing Title VII cases should vary depending on the
workplace. 144 By leaving the Rabidue decision unmentioned, the Williams
court leaves room for other courts to conclude that this type of reasoning
is still permitted.'
45
of risk defense). Today, the Sixth Circuit, as articulated in Williams, holds that the
standard should not be raised for women who work in male-dominated workplaces
because all working women should be equally covered by the law. See Williams, 187
F.3d at 564 (holding that assumption of risk doctrine is illogical in this arena and
would afford less protection to those women in workplaces where misconduct is
prevalent).
141. Compare Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (holding that traditional types of mis-
conduct of workplace should be considered in totality of circumstances), with Wil-
liams, 187 F.3d at 564 (holding that traditional misconduct should not be used to
excuse hostile work environment claims and should not influence standard in to-
tality of circumstances test).
142. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (holding long-standing misconduct should
not excuse hostile work environment sexual harassment). The majority criticizes
Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995), but fails to recognize, as
the dissent points out, that some courts may consider taking the prevailing culture
into account as "common sense" and "appropriate sensitivity." See id. at 571
(Ryan, J., dissenting) (discussing majority's use of dicta in Oncale). Judge Ryan
states the dicta in Oncale was previously recognized by "a sister circuit" which held:
"[W]e must evaluate [the plaintiff's] claim ... in the context of a blue collar envi-
ronment where crude language is commonly used." Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)).
143. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (criticizing reasoning in Gross). The court
held that the standard for sexual harassment does not vary depending on the work
environment and cited Gross instead of Rabidue. See id. (same). The Gross analysis
relied in part on Rabidue, and yet the Sixth Circuit did not mention its own case
anywhere in the opinion. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (relying on Rabidue v. Osceola
Ref Co., 584 F. Supp 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), afj'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.
1986)). The Rabidue decision was the benchmark decision for the use of prevailing
workplace norms in the totality of circumstances. See Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430
(discussing totality of circumstances test). For a discussion of totality of the cir-
cumstances, see supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit
also held that this principle in Rabidue was overruled in Harris, or at the very least
was overruled by Oncale. See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding Rabidue was overruled by Harris or Oncale).
144. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (distinguishing Tenth Circuit's decision in
Gross).
145. See Sheahan, 189 F.3d at 532-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing standards
under Title VII). The district court in Smith relied on Rabidue to discount the
seriousness of defendant's misconduct. See id. at 534 (criticizing district court's
decision to rely on Rabidue).
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3. Interpreting. Dicta in Oncale
The dicta in Oncale is ambiguous and can support the conflicting con-
tentions regarding the inclusion of prevailing workplace norms in the de-
termination of whether conduct passes the threshold test under Title
VII. 14 6 Although the Sixth Circuit recognized that prevailing workplace
norms and assumption of the risk should not discredit a woman's hostile
work environment claim against a male-dominated employer, the court
failed to see that other judges and juries can just as easily use "common
sense" and "an appropriate sensitivity to social context" to justify allowing
such prevailing norms to discount a plaintiff's claim. 147 In fact, Judge
Ryan, in his dissent, equally relied on Oncale to support the argument that
prevailing workplace norms can tend to discredit the pervasiveness of con-
duct when judged by the totality of the circumstances. 148 By ignoring
Judge Ryan's contention and failing to put forth more concrete factors,
the Sixth Circuit perpetuates vagueness in the application of Title VII.14 9
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit misunderstood the dicta in Oncale
when it held that varying the standard to the particular workplace is un-
necessary.' 15 0 The Sixth Circuit said that the existing standard under Har-
ris sufficiently ensures that Title VII will not become a general civility
code. 5 ' In Oncale, on the other hand, the Supreme Court instructed that
judges and juries must look to social context to ensure that Title VII is not
expanded into a general civility code. 15 2 Therefore, where the Williams
court uses this premise of civility to keep the standard equal for plaintiffs
in male-dominated professions, the Oncale Court would effectively raise
the bar. 1-
3
146. For a discussion on the dicta articulated in Oncale, see supra notes 73-89
and accompanying text.
147. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (Ryan,J., dissenting) (arguing that standard
for violation should vary depending on work environment).
148. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (relying on Oncale to support argument to
vary standard according to traditional social context of workplace).
149. For a discussion of application of the law, see supra notes 53-89 and ac-
companying text. Before Oncale and Williams, there was a circuit split among the
courts regarding whether prevailing workplace norms should be part of the totality
of circumstances test and whether these norms could be used to discredit alleged
misconduct. See Williams, 187 F.3d (Ryan, J., dissenting) (discussing disparity be-
tween majority opinion and other courts' decisions regarding inclusion of prevail-
ing workplace norms in totality of circumstances test).
150. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sews.,
523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
151. See id. (holding that raising bar for women in male-dominated profes-
sions is outside purview of Title VII as explained in Oncale).
152. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)
(finding that judges and juries should not mistake ordinary socializing among co-
workers for sexual harassment because doing so would go beyond purview of Title
VII).
153. Compare Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (arguing for using existing standard of
totality of circumstances), with Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82 (instructing juries and
judges to look beyond standard to social context and common sense).
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Based on the above analysis, the Sixth Circuit can reasonably be seen
to have reached the proper result while perpetuating more confusion in
the totality of the circumstances analysis when prevailing workplace norms
of a male-dominated work environment are at issue. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit opinion in Williams illustrates the need for clarification of the am-
biguity in deciding whether to include such factors as prevailing workplace
norms and assumption of the risk into the totality of the circumstances
analysis.
V. IMPACT
Despite the proper result in Williams, the Sixth Circuit did not pro-
vide sufficient measures to ensure that prevailing workplace norms will not
be used in a totality of circumstances analysis in the lower courts.1 54 By
allowing the Oncale dicta to be the basis for the totality of the circumstance
test, the Williams court may ironically make it easier for courts to grant
summary judgment against the plaintiffs in these cases.155 Some commen-
tators suggest that the potential for hostile work environment claims to be
decided at the summary judgment phase is particularly dangerous because
often only men will determine whether a particular pattern of harassment
creates a hostile work environment for women. 156 Although the Supreme
Court in Oncale was confident that juries and judges could use the social
context of a workplace to distinguish between "simple teasing" or "mere
utterance" and sexual harassment, commentators purport that there is a
difference between the stories of harassment being told by women and the
154. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 562 (using factors articulated in dicta in Oncale
for totality of circumstances test). The factors articulated in Oncale do not provide
concrete guidance for courts to determine whether prevailing workplace norms
must be considered in the totality of the circumstances test. See Weitzman, supra
note 55, at 57-59 (arguing that Oncale can provide support for opposite positions).
Judge Ryan noted that not only can Oncale be read to require courts to look at
prevailing culture, but also that the majority improperly interpreted Oncale, Harris
and Menitor in its holding. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 569 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing majority opinion's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent).
155. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (articulating stan-
dard for hostile work environment claims). Sexual harassment cases are increas-
ingly being decided by judicial fact finding instead of a jury. See Theresa M.
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 71, 97 (1999) (discussing summary judgment of sexual harassment
claims in lower courts).
156. See Schnapper, supra note 131, at 294 (discussing general practice of
lower courts to decide hostile work environment claims at summary judgment
phase). As some commentators suggest, this determination is better left to ajury
of one's peers instead of a judge sitting in isolation. See Beiner, supra note 155, at
75 (noting benefits of jury trial in these cases); see also Judith Olans Brown et al.,
The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 459 (1996) ("One of our most cherished myths is that
judges, insulated from the political process and sequestered from the hubbub of
daily living, are free to develop the objective intellectual abstractions (legal doc-
trine) which govern the conduct of society.").
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understanding of those stories by judges andjuries.' 57 As a result, female
plaintiffs may have less success in bringing hostile work environment
claims against male-dominated employers.
158
If women plaintiffs are not afforded opportunity in the courts, they
will be undoubtedly afforded less opportunity in the workplace. Thus, the
Supreme Court may need to clarify the meaning of Title VII for sexual
harassment cases once again. 159 This task, however, could be difficult be-
cause there is essentially no legislative history on the addition of sexual
discrimination to Title VII. 1 60 Another alternative is to create an eviden-
tiary rule that would govern whether prevailing workplace norms and as-
sumption of the risk should be weighed in the totality of the
circumstances. 16 1 The challenge in creating such an evidentiary determi-
nation would be recognizing the extreme fact sensitivity of the determina-
tion of hostile work environment claims.
162
In turn, if courts allow prevailing workplace norms to discount claims
of a hostile work environment, not only will there be an unequal applica-
tion of the law, but Title VII's purpose of providing equal opportunity to
women in the workplace will be thwarted, demoralizing women in the
workplace. 163 In addition, sexual harassment is costly for employees and
157. See Dolkhart, supra note 36, at 156 (discussing "dialectic between practice
and theory, experience and knowledge as applied to the developing hostile envi-
ronment case law"). One commentator suggests that this belief is a common mis-
conception that is perpetuated by misogynistic myths about men and women's
roles in the workplace. See Brown, supra note 156, at 459 (discussing myth that
judges can be impartial in deciding sexual harassment cases).
158. See generally Brown et al., supra note 156 at 516 (asserting that today's
legal standards and societal myths are preventing female plaintiffs from prevailing
in sexual harassment claims).
159. See Weitzman, supra note 55, at 56 (discussing recent Supreme Court
opinions that provide little guidance on sexual harassment law). As one commen-
tator surmises: "[Oncale] ha[s] provided a glass that is both half-full or half-empty
.... [and] it is clear that there is still a great deal of maneuvering room within the
language of the Court." Id. at 59.
160. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1985) (citing 110
CONG. REc. 2577-2584 (1964)); see also Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 19, at 521
(describing sentiment at time of enactment of Title VII).
161. See generally Schultz, supra note 1, at 1692 (discussing need to revamp
sexual harassment law in America).
162. See Deb Lussier, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. and the Fu-
ture of Title VII Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 39 B.C. L. REv. 937, 939 (1998) (ar-
guing for courts to permit only direct comparative evidence to support finding of
discrimination because of sex).
163. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,
J., dissenting) (commenting on demoralizing effects of harassment for female em-
ployees); see also Weitzman, supra note 55, at 27-28 (noting costs of harassment to
employers and employees). Many courts hold that the proliferation of pornogra-
phy, demeaning comments and generally anti-female animus, if sufficiently contin-
uous and pervasive, "may be found to create an atmosphere in which women are
viewed as men's sexual playthings rather than as their equal co-workers." Barbetta
v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
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employers alike. 1 64 Although sexual harassment in every aspect is eco-
nomically costly, it may also prove to cause a decrease in worker productiv-
ity and an increase in turnover and morale. 165 As a result, the cost that
sexual harassment creates on the workplace could result in costs for soci-
ety as a whole.
166
Maresa Torregrossa
164. See Gary Meyers, Sexual Harassment Can Be Costly for Eveyone, ST.J. REG. at
44 (Jan. 10, 1999) (discussing costs of suits for employers and employees); see also
STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ, PH.D., SEXUAL HARASSMENT & SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETv 159-61 (1996) (discussing studies that show sexual harassment negatively
affects workers). Some feel that "costly lawsuits and poor employee morale can
and will affect everyone's personal bottom line." Meyers, supra, at 44.
165. See Weitzman, supra note 55, at 27-28 (describing impact of sexual harass-
ment on workplace). Sexual harassment may also lead to poor concentration and
increased accidents by workers. See id. (same).
166. See id. (suggesting that costs get passed to consumers).
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